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On What a Distinctively Political Normativity Is1 
 
Normative political theory hopes to provide political prescriptions. It aims to describe what, for 
example, a commitment to democracy properly involves or which principles govern and so 
constitute a just system of property rights. Insofar as we are not merely interested in politics as 
an intriguing game but come to it with views about what democracy is, the rightful place of 
socio-economic equality in our political economy or any number of other animating convictions, 
we have an interest in seeing the task of normative political theory, which can help us think 
through them, carried out properly. Unless it is carried out properly, it may be difficult to 
adequately capture the concerns underlying work on, for instance, participation and 
responsiveness in democratic political systems (Sabl, 2016). In this sense, the recent growth in 
interest in normative political theory in methodological questions, and particularly about the 
relation of its prescriptions to the messy and unsatisfactory political reality with which we are 
familiar, ought to be of interest to scholars working across the academic discipline of politics. Is 
normative political theory being carried out properly, and what changes might we expect if it is 
not? 
One of the recent methodological debates, initiated for many of its participants by a posthumous 
collection of Bernard Williams’ work on political philosophy (Williams, 2005), has been around 
what Williams there called realism. Realists aim to defend the importance of “distinctively 
political thought” as opposed to the applied ethics they believe characterizes much 
contemporary political theory and causes it to misunderstand and make mistakes about its 
subject matter (Williams, 2005, p. 2). Matt Sleat’s recent edited collection, Politics Recovered, 
gives a sense of the range and significance of work which can be grouped under this 
commitment, stretching from Mark Philp’s exploration of the concept of corruption to Alison 
McQueen’s linkage of realism in international relations to the political theory variety (2018). 
Understandably, scholars working in normative political theory, conventionally conceived, have 
attempted to respond to the realist critique of their work, which has in turn prompted realist 
counter-responses (Erman & Moller, 2015; Erman & Moller, 2015; Jubb & Rossi, 2015; Jubb & 
Rossi, 2015). These exchanges have often seemed like they involve varying degrees of mutual 
misunderstanding and associated acrimony, and so in that sense Jonathan Leader Maynard and 
Alex Worsnip’s keenness to avoid the two sides talking past each other in their recent piece in 
Ethics, ‘Is There a Distinctively Political Normativity?’, is welcome (2018, p. 4ff). 
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Leader Maynard and Worsnip still suggest realism is mistaken, however constructive they at 
least intended to be, taking its denial of normative political theory’s “ineliminable roots in 
morality” to be an error (2018, p. 25). They make this suggestion by criticizing five arguments 
realists have made for the distinctive character of political normativity, and so try to disarm at 
least one of the ways in which realists criticize contemporary political theory’s supposed 
reliance on ethics and moral philosophy. However, there are two problems I identify here with 
Leader Maynard and Worsnip’s account. First, I do not think that their criticisms of the five 
arguments they discuss in the end succeed, and I will begin the remainder of this response by 
outlining where I think those criticisms fail. However, the strategy Leader Maynard and 
Worsnip adopt is not in the end unsatisfactory because it is, as it were, poorly executed; it seems 
to me also to misconceive the challenge its opponent presents and in that sense question the 
possibility of the kind of engagement for which they claim to hope. In that sense, my aim here is 
not even mainly to respond to the arguments Leader Maynard and Worsnip present, though I 
take that to be important too. My aim is to suggest that thinking about what is at issue in the 
way they do is, and is likely to continue to be, unproductive. 
Realism is most sensibly understood as a hostility to a way of doing political philosophy and 
theory, and much of the power it has lies in the alternatives it proposes. This is particularly so 
given the centrality of individual agency and so particularity and context in realism. It is not an 
accident that the posthumous collection of Williams’ political work that sparked contemporary 
interest in realism is called In the Beginning was the Deed. The challenge realism presents to 
moralism is unlikely to be settled by treating it as an attempt to demonstrate, in analytically 
rigorous terms, that moralism makes conceptual mistakes. Although such a strategy is 
problematic partly because it tries to assess realism on moralism’s terms, that is presumably 
inevitable to some degree. Instead, attempting to adjudicate between realism and moralism at 
the level of precise and perfectly generalizable methodological prescriptions is in the end 
unsatisfactory because there is not sufficient common ground to agree on the prescriptions at 
stake, their meaning or their connections to each other. Talking past each other is inevitable if 
realism is understood as that kind of challenge, not just because that is not how realists 
conceive of the challenge, but because it is difficult to see how there can be a shared 
characterization of what is at stake at that level. Rather than adopting Leader Maynard and 
Worsnip’s strategy, it would be better instead to consider the concrete attempts to describe, 
assess and offer guidance about politics that realists have made. To this end, as well as 
observing how Leader Maynard and Worsnip’s strategy seems inevitably to struggle, I will finish 
this piece by describing some of the work on political vices done by realists. 
Leader Maynard and Worsnip spend almost a quarter of their paper discussing what is at stake 
in disputes over whether “political theory is something like applied morality” (3). Parts of that 
discussion seem to me unsatisfactory. For example, for all Rawls’ insistence on political 
philosophy as a distinct category, his view is not standard and contra Leader Maynard and 
Worsnip much contemporary political philosophy does think of itself as “private morality writ 
large” (4 (italics suppressed)). This is precisely the point of not only of G. A. Cohen’s attacks on 
Rawls, but also of his positive work, exemplified in his argument that socialism is the best way 
to run society because it is the best way to run camping trips (2008, p. 1; 2009). Equally, 
revisionist just war theory centrally depends on treating restrictions on military violence as 
continuous with those that apply between private individuals, and so war as a somehow 
collectivized exercise of individual self-defence (Rodin, 2002). Relatedly, defining the realist 
view as “that political principles are of a different, non-moral normative kind altogether” (5 
(italics suppressed)), as Leader Maynard and Worsnip do, appears to ignore, for example, 
Williams’ description of his basic legitimation demand as distinct from moralist approaches 
because it arises from within politics and so does “not represent a morality which is prior to 
politics” (2005, p. 5). Like many other realists, Williams here does not require that normativity 
avoid morality altogether, but that prescriptions are in some way filtered through or aligned to 
politics as a category (Sleat, 2016, p. 253). This would still leave political normativity distinct 
from moral normativity, in the sense that the weight, direction and relevance of different 
considerations would all systematically be altered by politics’ constitutive features.  
In the end, Leader Maynard and Worsnip favour construing the distinction between political 
and moral normativity not on the basis of how prescriptions respond to the features of a 
particular domain, but on the basis of the kind of ought involved. They illustrate this way of 
drawing that distinction by reference to Stephen Darwall’s characterization of morality as 
specifically concerned with resentment, in which the moral ought becomes that ought whose 
breach warrants resentment (5). Although Leader Maynard and Worsnip do not endorse 
Darwall’s conception of morality, which would be problematic given the role resentment plays 
in several prominent realist accounts (Williams, 2005, pp. 75-96), or indeed any other, this 
causes them other difficulties. Without a firm commitment to some specific way of 
understanding the relevant distinction between moral and political normativity, the criteria of 
success for their arguments necessarily remain ambiguous. What does it take to show that 
prescriptions are in the end moral, if it is unclear what constitutes either distinctively moral or, 
contrastingly, distinctively political prescriptions? Given that this terrain is, almost inevitably, 
contested and that disentangling the substantive and semantic disagreements involved in that 
dispute is likely to be extremely difficult without teasing them out through their use in 
particular contexts, it is unsurprising that the strategy Leader Maynard and Worsnip adopt of 
seeking to resolve this debate at a completely general conceptual level struggles. Stating the 
terms on which their solution depends without prejudging or obscuring substantive questions 
may well be impossible, and the more they do so, the more a supposed solution will miss the 
point. 
The five arguments for a distinctive political normativity Leader Maynard and Worsnip try to 
reject are that the truth of a moral claim does not make it “legitimate to enforce politically” (8); 
that because “there is deep disagreement over moral claims, morality cannot resolve what to 
do” politically (9); that since “political normativity should be understood in a constructivist 
manner, while moral normativity should not”, there is a metanormative difference between the 
two (14: italics suppressed); that “the differences in the content of private morality and political 
normativity are so [great] that the two cannot plausibly be regarded as belonging to the same… 
overarching category” (16-17: italics suppressed); and that Williams’ basic legitimation demand 
“is a demand from within politics itself, and thus represents a distinctively political normativity” 
(20). The arguments with which Leader Maynard and Worsnip try to reject these five realist 
claims are all, in one way or another, problematic, I think even on their own terms, and I will go 
on to try briefly to show why. At this level of generality, though, questions of reasonable 
interpretation and implication are all themselves rather abstract and so similarly subject to 
interpretative and implicative controversy. While perhaps not all the difficulties into which 
Leader Maynard and Worsnip fall result from their approach to the question, the persistence of 
these problems should be indicative. Where methodological questions and so how to use and 
understand terms are at stake, abstract general arguments are often not the best way to attempt 
to resolve more concrete disputes.  
Leader Maynard and Worsnip do not see the first realist argument as “the core realist rationale” 
but something “which occasionally seems implicit in realist writings” (8). This argument moves 
from limits to the political enforceability of even valid moral claims to a distinctive political 
normativity.  Politics cannot be applied morality because the validity of a moral claim does not 
show that it has any implications for the grounds on which people may be coerced. As Leader 
Maynard and Worsnip point out, many supposedly moralist philosophers and theorists admit 
that there are limits to the political enforceability of valid moral claims; they just see those 
limits as moral, as “a special case of the more general point… that actor A morally ought to do 
action X, while… actor B morally ought not to force actor A to do action X” (9). Realists who 
claim that moralism involves the denial of limits on the enforceability of moral claims are then 
relying on “inaccurate caricatures” (8). However, the familiarity of both the general point and 
least some of its special cases suggest that realists are aware of them. That in turn suggests that 
they are unlikely to have made an argument whose success depends on them being unaware of 
either. Indeed, neither of the quotations from realists Leader Maynard and Worsnip use 
straightforwardly support the idea that realists move from a claim about the importance of 
limits on the enforcement of morality to a claim about political normativity. Where they quote 
Enzo Rossi and Robert Jubb accusing moralists of demanding the enforcement of private 
morality, we were reporting a conclusion we had argued followed from rejecting a distinction 
between politics and sheer domination (Jubb & Rossi, 2015, p. 4). The other quotation they 
provide, from Edward Hall about discounting objections from fellow citizens who are only 
mistaken interlocutors, relates to Williams’ attack on a specific way of theorizing liberty (Hall, 
2017, p. 294). This seems an unfortunate reversion to the norm of responding to realists by 
inaccurately attributing obviously implausible views to them, and so in tension with Leader 
Maynard and Worsnip’s aspiration to move beyond acrimony. 
The second argument Leader Maynard and Worsnip consider moves to a distinctive political 
normativity from a claim about the centrality of moral disagreement to politics. Politics cannot 
be governed by morality because politics is only necessary insofar as we fail to agree what, 
morally, we ought to do. This argument fails, they claim, because “it rests on a misconstrual of 
the role that moralists want their principles to play”. Moralists are not hoping to settle political 
questions with their prescriptions, but instead to evaluate “political processes and their 
outcomes in terms of their justice, rightness and so on” (11). Although Leader Maynard and 
Worsnip go on to consider various further questions they see as related to that distinction 
between de facto and normative resolutions, like what role an error theory might play, the 
distinction seems to miss realists’ basic point here. I might evaluate a practice, institution, 
object, event or relationship from any number of perspectives. That something is, in its own 
terms, a coherent evaluation does not tell us anything about the relevance of that evaluation to 
how what it evaluates ought to be treated. An evaluation of the British Library’s collection in 
terms of each member’s individual resale value, even as books and manuscripts rather than as, 
say, kindling, would not give us conclusive reasons to do anything. Part of its point is that it is a 
collection. Similarly, there is an obvious reason why straightforwardly moral evaluations of 
political processes and outcomes are not clearly relevant to those processes and outcomes. 
Insofar as the evaluations assume, for example, high levels of moral agreement and compliance 
they are not evaluations of them as solutions to familiar political problems. Familiar political 
problems are in part constituted by the absence of high levels of moral agreement and 
compliance, and so straightforwardly moral evaluations are instead evaluations of situations 
where political problems exist, if at all, quite differently. 
Participants in disputes about the currency of egalitarian justice, for example, often insist that 
questions about implementing their favoured currency are irrelevant to its justification. For 
example, that someone resents being questioned about their level of happiness does not impugn 
using happiness as a way of measuring whether they have been treated appropriately equally to 
others (Cohen, 1989, p. 910). Yet resentment of this sort is an inevitable feature of any attempt 
to distribute happiness equally in the real world. Does equality so conceived then require a 
proxy for happiness, and if so, which? Should that proxy take into account resentments that 
might be produced by its use, and in particular its use in contrast to the proper measure of 
happiness on which the just might rightly insist? The insistence on ignoring central features of 
political life, like predictable if morally disappointing resentment at intrusive questioning by 
agents of the state, leaves the view unable to say much about what actually ought to be done. 
How evaluations of this sort are supposed to guide actors faced with problems which are 
necessarily absent in them is quite opaque (Tomlin, 2012; Jubb, 2016). If anything, it is moral 
normativity which is threatened by Leader Maynard and Worsnip’s distinction, since the retreat 
into evaluation threatens to strip moral claims of their prescriptive power and political 
relevance. 
Leader Maynard and Worsnip’s attempts to turn their third and fourth realist argument both 
rely on their rather demanding account of what a distinctively political normativity involves. 
The third realist argument is that political normativity is distinct from moral normativity 
because it is constructed, whereas moral normativity is not. This metanormative difference 
would distinguish the two forms of normativity. As Leader Maynard and Worsnip note, there 
are a number of difficulties in holding that two seemingly closely-linked forms of normativity 
have such different foundations, particularly given many realists’ scepticism about morality 
(14ff). What they do not explain though is why the metanormative difference has to be between 
different kinds of foundations rather than between different kinds of constructions. Epistemic 
normativity could well be, if constructed, constructed quite differently from moral normativity, 
if moral normativity is constructed. The features and capacities we have as agents relevant to 
the construction are likely to be quite distinct, and to shape the process of construction 
accordingly. How we ought to relate to our capacities to form beliefs is likely to be very different 
from how we ought to relate to each other, for example, as agents with a particular set of mutual 
vulnerabilities, not just in terms of the content of the relevant prescriptions but in their 
underlying structure and rationale. The idea of justification may well not just impose a different 
set of requirements, but play a different role, for instance. The same could equally be true of any 
difference between constructed moral and political normativity. It is not obviously implausible 
to think of such differences as metanormative, or clear how a sufficiently sharp boundary could 
be drawn to exclude or include them without begging the question, or that what any differences 
are called makes much difference as long as they are there.  
The fourth argument that Leader Maynard and Worsnip discuss claims that there are such 
significant first-order normative differences between moral and political prescriptions that they 
must be seen as different kinds of normativity. However, even if politics is “systematically more 
consequentialist” than private morality, even if there are distinctive political virtues, that does 
not show that those demands cannot be captured under an overarching moral principle or that 
the virtues should not be used only for morally sanctioned ends (16, quoting (Philp, 2010, pp. 
474-475); 17ff). Here, again, we are left with the question of what counts as distinctive. Science 
as a practice is constituted in part by various norms: what counts as evidence for and against a 
proposition, how that evidence is to be weighted and combined coming to a conclusion, what 
should and shouldn’t be said publicly, who counts as a member of the relevant public, and so on. 
Many of these norms relate, often as specifications of more general prescriptions, to epistemic 
norms more broadly. That does not seem to me to support the claim that there is no distinctive 
scientific normativity. Whether there is a distinctive scientific normativity depends, for example, 
in part on how useful it is to treat the norms of science as comprising a separate field, not 
whether, in principle, they could be reduced to their often rather distant foundations in the 
norms of a pre-existing field. Equally, realists, including Philp, do not think it is useful to 
understand political philosophy as continuous with moral philosophy. That it may be possible to 
offer foundations for the former in the latter does not show there is nothing distinctive about it. 
The fifth and final argument Leader Maynard and Worsnip consider involves treating the 
achievement of a certain kind of legitimacy as definitive of politics. On this account, politics 
distinguishes right from might by requiring political authorities to offer an explanation of their 
authority to their subjects. Since neither the requirements of or for the explanation are fixed 
outside of politics, political normativity is distinct. The most basic question of politics is asked 
for and answered with reasons themselves drawn from politics. Leader Maynard and Worsnip 
find this argument problematic because, at best, even assuming problems with the definition of 
politics can be overcome,2 this does not provide a good reason for engaging in politics in the 
first place. The normative question has just been pushed “back from “why, in a given situation, 
should we practice politics in one way rather than another?” to “why, in a given situation, 
should we practice politics, rather than something else?”” (22). Just as we can ask why we 
should employ people rather than force them to work, we can ask why we should do politics, 
rather than organize our collective life in some other, as yet unspecified way, or perhaps 
eliminate it all together. Leader Maynard and Worsnip claim this undermines the 
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distinctiveness of political normativity in the same way and to the same extent as the idea that 
there are overarching moral principles which capture the greater consequentialism of political 
life. That political principles and questions can, in the end, be reduced to a different sort of 
principle or question supposedly shows that there are no distinctively political principles or 
questions, independently of whether there are good reasons to treat political principles and 
questions as distinctive. At the very least, this is a kind of reductionist foundationalism that 
requires independent support. 
The five realist arguments Leader Maynard and Worsnip attempt to rebut then may well survive 
their attacks. This, I suggest, is because there are underlying commitments, assumptions and 
habits of thought which structure all of our engagements with debates between realists and 
moralists. It is very difficult to get clear about how all those factors shape the debate, never 
mind about how we ought to try to understand or interpret them in that context. Political 
philosophers and theorists seemingly cannot agree what counts as a distinctive political 
normativity, let alone what would be conclusive evidence in favour of or against it. At a general 
conceptual level, it is and seemingly always will be very difficult to resolve disputes over 
realism and moralism. It would be better to move to consider the distinctiveness of political 
thought from another angle. 
Realists tend to emphasize, when suggesting that getting to grips with politics requires 
distinctive modes of thought, that politics is structured by relationships of power. Enforcement 
of collectively-binding decisions, particularly on those who disagree with them, and the 
practices and institutions that go with it are necessary parts of politics. This is the one of the 
two premises from which Williams’s Basic Legitimation Demand arises, for instance. Unless 
might is being exercised, there is no question about what might legitimate it. This focus on 
power should be familiar to anyone who has been following debates between realists and 
moralists. What may be less clear is the range and form of questions this opens. Taking seriously 
the reality of power in political relationships means thinking through its effects, both on those 
over whom it is exercised and on those who exercise it. This is what Bernard Williams means to 
draw attention to when he says that what a political decision “immediately announces” is that 
one side “have lost” and not that they are “morally wrong, or indeed, wrong at all” (Williams, 
2005, p. 13). Political decisions have practical rather than immediately theoretical 
consequences. Various resentments and refusals may follow from them and they, along with the 
opportunities such decisions also create, need to be thought through and understood and 
assessed. 
Consider for example Judith Shklar’s Ordinary Vices. There, Shklar tried to do what she took “to 
be the job of political theory: to make our conversations and convictions about our society more 
complete and coherent and to review critically the judgments we ordinarily make and the 
possibilities we see” (Shklar, 1984, p. 226). Rather than a focus on how particular choices ought 
to be made or the values instantiated by creating a particular institution, Shklar sought to do 
that by exploring five everyday vices and how those negative ideals of character might relate to 
each other, to the rest of an individual’s or a group’s character and to social and political 
institutions and the shared goods they create and sustain. By arguing that we should put cruelty 
first, she hoped to show that we should adopt what she called there and elsewhere the 
liberalism of fear. Putting cruelty first and the liberalism of fear go together for Shklar because 
both have the courage to choose “self-restraining tolerance” over promises of virtue that will in 
the end necessitate “military and moral repression and violence” (1984, p. 5). As this suggests, 
the distinctive point of the liberalism of fear is its central focus on the pathologies of power and 
its exercise. As Shklar put it, for the liberalism of fear “the basic units of political life are not 
discursive and reflective persons, nor friends and enemies, nor patriotic soldier-citizens, nor 
energetic litigants, but the weak and the powerful” (1989, p. 27).  
Certainly one might disagree with the horror Shklar clearly feels at the effects of cruelty, just as 
one might question the links she draws between it and the cautious suspicion, particularly 
about any claims to singular or distinctive virtue, that makes up the liberalism of fear as much 
as any set of institutional prescriptions. Perhaps cruelty is not always as awful or as inevitably 
associated with projects for ensuring rule by the most virtuous, just or enlightened as Shklar 
feared. Some form of individual and collective moral perfection may be achievable without 
trying and failing to eliminate disagreements that are “both ineluctable and tolerable, and 
entirely necessary for any degree of freedom” (Shklar, 1984, p. 227). Loathing hypocrisy, most 
particularly in oneself, might not be quite the invitation to a destructive hatred of humankind 
Shklar supposed. Maybe puritanical moral critics are wrong to claim we are terrible backsliding 
hypocrites, just as we may be wrong to suspect that their disapproval conceals and is 
significantly motivated by an awareness of the hollowness of their own professions of rectitude. 
The choice Shklar in the end offers between the rage of those disgusted by the cheap betrayals 
of liberal and representative politics and the society it creates, and the more impersonal, 
resigned misanthropy of those who reconcile themselves to them, fearing cruelty more, is, after 
all, rather stark. 
Those though are the sorts of claims that Ordinary Vices makes. There, Shklar does not make a 
series of claims about the abstract methodological injunctions which justify treating political 
normativity as (sufficiently) distinct from moral normativity with which we might engage with 
in the way that Leader Maynard and Worsnip seek. She does not use that mode of reasoning 
because she prefers a more discursive, allusive method, often leaning on stories of one sort and 
another, in order to get at the “subtle interactions”, the “ritual, display, social exchanging and 
acting out in the public arena”, that interest it (1984, p. 231). That does not mean those relying 
on a philosophical style of “arguments and counterarguments designed to avoid contradiction 
and exception” that Shklar consciously avoids gain nothing from her work, either in Ordinary 
Vices or more broadly (1984, p. 6). Shklar aims to think through the broader effects, the 
phenomenology and slow accumulation of new habits and patterns of thought, not easily 
captured by “general laws or models… necessary for assessing the rational consistency and 
consequences of specific decisions or policy choices” (1984, p. 231). These effects, generated by 
the enforcement (or not) of specific decisions and policy choices as they ramify through a 
system, are central to our experience of our social and political lives and so to their coherence, 
stability and sustainability. 
What a society’s members can sensibly be expected to think of it and what can sensibly be said 
in response to them has to matter to political theory and philosophy. It mattered to John Rawls, 
widely regarded as the central influence on the sub-discipline’s current form and practice. It 
was crucial to his argument against utilitarianism through the requirements of finality and 
publicity even in A Theory of Justice (1971, p. 175ff). The characters a society creates and with 
which it can live are plausibly best explored as Shklar tries. Her claims, for example, can be 
contrasted with G. A. Cohen’s claims about the greed and fear that allegedly typically 
predominate in market transactions (2009, p. 40). As Williams observed, this “extraordinary” 
view “leaves out entirely one of the most significant motives expressed in markets: mutual 
advantage”. No-one supposes that either a small shopkeeper or her customers are primarily 
driven by greed or fear in their interactions, and Cohen’s view can only be based on “a model of 
some markets rather than others, in particular of a labour market based on unequal income” 
(1997, p. 56). As one of the standard-bearers of abstraction and freeing political and moral 
theory and philosophy from awkward facts (2003), the implausibility of Cohen’s claims about 
ordinary vices are indicative of the contrasting strengths of Shklar’s method and its focus on 
how power plays out through a set of practices and institutions. Shklar once described the 
liberalism of fear using Emerson’s contrast between the party of hope and the party of memory 
(1989, p. 26), and both the liberalism of fear and her work more broadly draw on history in 
ways than is, or perhaps should be, common in contemporary moral and political philosophy 
and theory. Those so completely trained as members of a party of hope they are unaware of the 
party of memory may find her work and that of other realists difficult to grasp, and be tempted 
to approach it with hopeful methods. They will though be missing its point, as I hope I have 
shown here. 
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